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Discrete Rent-Seeking Games with an
Application to Evidence Production
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci*
Lewis A. Kornhauser†

Evidence production at trial, the accumulation of patents in a
technological race, and lobbying are contests that often involve
strategic choices over a discrete set of options. The literature
has primarily focused on games with continuous effort choices.
We ﬁll this gap by studying a rent-seeking game with discrete
effort choices and, for a signiﬁcant class of games, derive a
transformation rule that allows one to ﬁnd the equilibrium of
the discrete game from the equilibrium of the continuous
game, which is much simpler to identify. We also discuss the
limits of this approach and how well the continuous game
approximates the discrete one.
1. INTRODUCTION
Parties engaged in a legal dispute compete with each other in the production of evidence, which in turn determines the way in which the
court will adjudicate the case. Evidence production can be studied
through the lens of rent-seeking games: the parties’ expended efforts
are otherwise unproductive investments whose only purpose is to affect the way in which the “pie” will be divided by the court. Although
the amount and quality of the evidence produced by the parties can
have beneﬁcial effects for society in terms of better-quality decisions,
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the evolution of new precedents, and the production of ex ante incentives to avoid harmful behavior—and hence evidence production is
not at all a worthless activity—the rent-seeking perspective captures
fairly accurately the particular incentives of most parties ex post, that
is, at the moment they become involved in a dispute.
There is a vast literature on rent-seeking games—originating from
the seminal papers by Tullock (1967, 1980) and Krueger (1974)—and
this literature has examined virtually all possible variations of the original setting.1 However, the universal approach has been to consider the
effort expended by the contestants as a continuous variable.2 Indeed,
monetary expenditures can be made in increments that are small enough
to be approximated by a continuous variable. Nevertheless, in many
real-life situations, the parties can only choose among a discrete (albeit possibly inﬁnite) set of effort levels. Evidence production, for instance, involves discrete decisions, such as the number of witnesses
to appear in court or how many experts to hire. Many other rent-seeking
contexts also involve discrete decisions. Think of a race to accumulate
patents related to a particular technology or the decision to hire an
additional lobbyist. In this article, we ﬁll this gap by considering the classic rent-seeking game in which two (possibly asymmetric) risk-neutral
parties seek an indivisible prize; the investment of each party determines the probability that each will win. (Given risk-neutrality, this
setup also captures cases in which the prize is split between the parties.) Differently from the standard setup, the parties make a discrete
number of investments into the game.
We analyze a class of symmetric and asymmetric rent-seeking games
with discrete strategy spaces and address several questions. Our main
result is presented in proposition 1. We identify a sufﬁcient condition
under which the equilibrium of the discrete game lies in the closest possible neighborhood around the equilibrium of the continuous game.
This condition essentially points to the asymmetry between the parties’ costs of efforts as the relevant factor. If the parties’ costs of effort
are relatively similar, the equilibrium of the discrete game lies neatly
in the closest possible neighborhood around the equilibrium of the continuous game. However, as the parties’ costs start to diverge, so do
the parties’ abilities to optimize their behavior. The party with the
largest cost of effort can effectively choose among a more restricted set

1
For recent reviews, see Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008a, 2008b); Congleton
and Hillman (2015). A review of the literature on asymmetric rent-seeking games, which
will form the basis for our model, can be found in Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2015).
2
A solitary exception to this trend is Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (1994), which, however, only analyzes symmetric games and focuses on the problem of increasing returns to
effort. We examine possibly asymmetric parties with constant returns to effort.
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of options as compared with the other party with lower cost of effort—
a fact that we will illustrate momentarily by means of an example. The
asymmetry in the parties’ costs of effort hence translates into an asymmetry in their ability to optimize and results in an advantage for the
lower-cost party. It is that party’s ability to exploit this advantage that
breaks the correspondence between the equilibrium of the continuous
game and that of the discrete game. Under the condition identiﬁed in
proposition 1, we provide four additional sets of results.
We show that, although the continuous game always has a unique
pure strategy equilibrium, the discrete game may have a unique pure
strategy equilibrium or a mixed strategy equilibrium (which we characterize). Next, we compare the equilibrium of the discrete game with
the equilibrium of the continuous game and offer a simple transformation rule that allows the analyst to solve the discrete game by ﬁrst solving the (much simpler) continuous game and then applying our transformation rule to the result. Moreover, we show that the continuous
approximation of a discrete game is more accurate if (i) the contested
prize grows toward inﬁnity, (ii) the parties’ marginal costs of effort are
closer to each other, or (iii) the set of admissible discrete values for the
parties’ efforts becomes denser—that is, the interval between two contiguous admissible values decreases.
Finally, we demonstrate that if the condition identiﬁed in proposition 1 is not satisﬁed, the correspondence between the continuous and
the discrete game may break down. This shows that, although the condition in proposition 1 is only sufﬁcient, and hence we may err on the
side of caution when using the equilibrium of a continuous game to
approximate the equilibrium of the corresponding discrete game, caution is warranted because the procedure we propose applies only to a
subset of games.
Next, we bring our theory to bear on a concrete contest in which parties make discrete investments into the game: evidence production in
court. Typically, evidence is a collection of discrete elements: documents, experts, eyewitnesses, and so forth. In the model, parties hire
an attorney at an hourly fee; the attorney then looks for evidence. We
show that, although the attorney is paid in an (almost) continuous
currency, the parties’ strategy spaces remain discrete and the equilibrium can be found by using our transformation rule.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic
model, discuss the benchmark case of the continuous game, and introduce the discrete game. In section 3, we study the discrete game and deliver our main results. In section 4, we discuss the accuracy of the continuous approximation of the discrete game. In section 5, we illustrate
our ﬁndings in the context of a symmetric game. In section 6, we apply
our theory to evidence production. Finally, in section 7, we conclude.
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2. BASIC MODEL
2.1. Setup
In the model, we use a standard framework à la Tullock. Two parties,
A and B, exert effort a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0, respectively, in a contest to win a
prize with value v > 0. The prize is shared proportionally to the parties’ efforts (and is shared equally if both parties invest 0). The parties
are identical but for their marginal costs of effort, which are respectively cA > 0 and cB > 0.
Parties are risk-neutral and hence the success function can be interpreted indifferently as an actual share of the prize or as a probability of winning the entire prize. The parties’ maximization problems
are as follows:


a
v − cA a ðAÞ
maxa
a+b
,
(1)


b
v − cB b ðBÞ
maxb
a+b
where we impose a=(a + b) = b=(a + b) = 1=2 if a = b = 0. In the next
subsection, we review the standard case in which effort is a continuous variable, which we use as a benchmark. Next, we examine a
discrete version of the same game.

2.2. Benchmark: The Continuous Game
As a benchmark, we consider the standard rent-seeking game with continuous effort spaces. Parties A and B play the game by choosing effort
from the nonnegative real line: a ∈ ½0, ∞) and b ∈ ½0, ∞). The problems
2
in equation (1) have ﬁrst-order conditions vb=(a + b) = cA and va=
2
(a + b) = cB for party A and B, respectively. (The second-order conditions are satisﬁed.) As is well known, this game has a unique Nash equilibrium where the parties make the following investments into the
game:
a* =

cB
v ðAÞ
ðcA + cB Þ2

b* =

cA
v ðBÞ
ðcA + cB Þ2

:

(2)

From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we can derive the parties’ reaction
functions:
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v
b − b ðAÞ
cA
,
rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v
b** ðaÞ = a − a ðBÞ
cB
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a** ðbÞ =

(3)

which will be useful later.

2.3. The Discrete Game
Now let us consider an alternative model in which the parties’ effort
space is discrete: a ∈ f0, e, 2e, 3e:::g and b ∈ f0, e, 2e, 3e :::g, where
e > 0 is the distance between any two admissible levels of effort. We
can think of e as a measure of the coarseness of the parties’ choice sets.
When e is large, the choice sets are coarse and the parties have relatively few options to choose among. In contrast, as e decreases, the
parties’ choice sets become denser, giving parties more opportunities
to optimize their behavior. Note that as e → 0, the discrete game approaches the continuous game. (When e = 1, the parties’ available efforts choices are nonnegative integers.)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we use the term “ﬂoor of x” or
the symbol x to refer to the element in the effort set {0, e, 2e, 3e ...} that
is closest to the real number x from below; analogously, we use the
 to refer to the closest value above
term “ceiling of x” or the symbol x
x in the set {0, e, 2e, 3e ...}. (When e = 1, the ﬂoor of x is the integer directly below x and the ceiling of x is the integer directly above x, as in
the usual interpretation.) To visualize: in the continuous game, the
parties’ choices of effort can be represented by any point on the positive real plane with coordinates (a, b). In contrast, in the discrete
game, the parties’ choices of efforts are restricted to the intersection
points of a grid with square cells of width and height equal to e, which
lies in the same plane.
Note that, although the parties’ effort sets are (countably) inﬁnite,
it is undesirable for a party to spend more than the prize at stake, so
that the maximum effort a party can proﬁtably make is yi e = ( v=ci ),
for i ∈ fA, Bg; that is, the greatest value in the set {0, e, 2e, 3e...} that is
less than v=ci . In turn, this observation makes the parties’ effort sets
effectively ﬁnite, or equal to {0, e, 2e, 3e,..., yie}. Application of Nash’s
(1951) theorem guarantees that the discrete game must have at least
one Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium of the discrete game in a simple way, we
propose the following two-step procedure:
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1. Find the equilibrium of the continuous game, (a*, b*);
2. Solve the restricted discrete game in which party A can only
play a ∈ fa* , a* g and party B can only play b ∈ fb* , b* g.
In section 3, we will ﬁrst show under what (sufﬁcient, but not necessary) conditions the equilibrium of the restricted game is a (possibly
unique) equilibrium of the full game. Next, we investigate whether
the equilibrium of the continuous game is a good approximation of
the equilibrium of the discrete game. Most of the proofs will leverage
on the fact that a party’s payoff function in equation (1) is strictly concave in that party’s effort and hence parties prefer effort levels that are
closer to their reaction functions.
2.4. An Illustration
Consider ﬁgure 1. The equilibrium of the continuous game lies at the
intersection of the parties’ reaction functions, the dashed lines in the

Figure 1. Candidate equilibria of a discrete game with v = 10, cA = 2, cB = 1:8,
and ε = 1
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Table 1. Parties’ Payoffs (A, B) in a Discrete Game with v = 10, cA = 2,
cB = 1.8 and e = 1
...

...

b=4

(0, 2.8)

(0, .8)

(−.66, −.53)

(−1.71, −1.48)

(−3, −2.2)

...

b=3

(0, 4.6)

(.5, 2.1)

(0, .6)

(−1, −.4)

(−2.28, 1.11)

...

b=2

(0, 6.4)

(1.33, 3.06)

(1, 1.4)

(0, .4)

(−1.33, −.26)

...

b=1

(0, 8.2)

(3, 3.2)

(2.66, 1.53)

(1.5, .7)

(0, .2)

...

b=0

(5, 5)

(8, 0)

(6, 0)

(4, 0)

(2, 0)

...

a=0

...

a=1

...

a=2

...

a=3

...

a=4

...

...

Note: Payoffs of the restricted game are in bold.

ﬁgure. In the discrete game, the parties may be unable to play these
equilibrium strategies as they will typically be outside the parties’ discrete choice sets. Our proposed procedure implies restricting attention to the four candidate equilibrium—the four points (the vertices
of the square) around the continuous equilibrium.
To illustrate, consider a simple game in which the prize at stake is
v = 10, the parties’ marginal costs of effort are cA = 2 and cB = 1:8 and
e = 1, so that in the discrete game parties can only choose integer
levels of effort. The equilibrium of the continuous game is a* =
2
2
(1:8=(2 + 1:8) )10 = 1:24 and b* = (2=(2 + 1:8) )10 = 1:38. The procedure introduced earlier allows us to restrict attention to a subset
of the parties’ choices, namely, to the integers above and below
the continuous equilibrium: a ∈ f1, 2g and b ∈ f1, 2g, as indicated
by the four points around (a*, b*) in ﬁgure 1. Table 1 reports the corresponding parties’ payoffs, (A, B), in the discrete game; the payoffs
of the restricted game are in bold. It is easy to see that the equilibrium of the restricted game is (a* = 1, b* = 1)—and that this is also
the equilibrium of the full game. (In table 1, we only report a subset
of the game’s payoffs, but note that the payoffs become negative
as we move further away from the continuous equilibrium; the full
table is in the appendix.)
3. ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the conditions under which the procedure
highlighted earlier is valid. To preview our results: proposition 1 shows
that if the parties’ marginal costs of effort are not “too” asymmetric, the
equilibrium of the discrete game is contained in the square cell around
the equilibrium of the continuous game and hence the procedure
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introduced earlier can be applied. If this sufﬁcient condition is not
met, our procedure may fail to identify the correct equilibrium. Proposition 2 provides the conditions for this equilibrium to be in pure
strategies or in mixed strategies and, in the former case, identiﬁes
which of the four vertices of the cell is an equilibrium. Proposition 3
shows that the pure strategy equilibrium (when it exists) is unique
and proposition 4 characterizes the mixing probabilities of the mixed
strategy equilibria. Proposition 5 and 6 examine when the continuous
game is a good approximation of the discrete game and, ﬁnally, proposition 7 provides a counterexample, showing that outside the domain
of the sufﬁcient conditions given in proposition 1, the solution to
the restricted game may not identify the equilibrium of the full game.
To start, let
^cA ;

a* − b*
2b*

b* − a*
^cB ;
2a*

(4)

be threshold levels for the parties’ marginal costs of effort, cA and cB.
Note that, as a* and b* depend on the costs, these thresholds are
only implicitly deﬁned in terms of the equilibrium of the continuous
game and they are both equal to zero if the parties’ costs of effort are
symmetric. In addition, let
n
 
 
o
 
E ; a* , b* , a* , b* , a* , b* , a* , b*
be the equilibrium set. This set contains the ﬂoor and the ceiling of the
equilibrium of the continuous game—that is, the four points around
the continuous equilibrium, as depicted in ﬁgure 1, and describes the
parties’ choice sets in the restricted game.
In the next proposition, we will show that, if the parties’ marginal
costs of effort lie above the thresholds in equation (4)—that is, when
cA and cB ≥ ^cB , then solving the restricted game provides a solucA ≥ ^
tion for the full game and the equilibrium of the full game is in E.
Most of our results depend on the asymmetry between the parties’
marginal costs of effort; ﬁgure 2 visualizes the region in which these
conditions are satisﬁed in the (cA, cB) plane for e = 1. Note that the
conditions are always satisﬁed if the parties are symmetric cA = cB
and that they are more easily satisﬁed if the prize at stake is large.
Note also that if cA > cB , then we have a* < b* and the condition
cA ≥ ^
cA is always satisﬁed and hence only the threshold ^cB is binding.
Vice versa if cA < cB . Hence, looking at ﬁgure 2, the condition cA > ^cA

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser
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cA and cB ≥ ^
cB
Figure 2. Values of cA and cB such that cA ≥ ^
(for e = 1).

is active above the diagonal, whereas the condition cB > ^cB is active
below the diagonal.
Proposition 1. If cA ≥ c^A and cB ≥ ^cB , the discrete game has a
Nash equilibrium that lies in the equilibrium set E.
Proof of Proposition 1. See appendix. QED
Proposition 1 shows that if the parties are not too asymmetric concerning their marginal costs of effort, the discrete game has an easyto-ﬁnd solution that lies in the smallest (discrete) neighborhood
around the equilibrium of the continuous game. Then we can apply
an easy transformation rule, which we provide in the next proposition. The intuition for the result in proposition 1 is straightforward.
The number of choices available to a party in the discrete game depends on that party’s cost of effort. A large cost of effort implies that
a party has few effort levels to choose from. Think of a game with
v = 10, e = 1, and cA = 5: party A can effectively choose to exert effort
a = 0 (thereby spending 0), effort a = 1 (which costs 5), or effort a = 2
(which costs as much as the prize, 10). Imagine that party B’s cost of
effort is cB = 1. Repeating the same reasoning, it is easy to see that
the effective choices available to party B are b ∈ f0, 1, ::::10g, so that
party B can more easily ﬁne-tune his or her effort level around what
would be theoretically optimal if party B could choose among a continuum of options. In contrast, party A’s choices are coarser. This asymmetry in the parties’ ability to optimize their behavior causes our procedure
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to break down because the party with the ﬁner decision set can exploit
the other party’s coarseness to his or her advantage, as will be further
explained when commenting on proposition 7. Note also that changes
in v and in e affect the scale of the problem, but do not change the relative size of the parties’ costs, which generates the relevant asymmetry.
Under the conditions of proposition 1, we can solve the full game
simply by solving the restricted game. In the following proposition,
we study the characteristics of the equilibrium of the restricted game:
namely, whether the game has a pure or a mixed strategy equilibrium
and, if the equilibrium is in pure strategies, which of the four points in
E is the equilibrium point. Let
cA ; 

b*

v
a * + e + b* a * + b*

cB ; 

a*

v
a * + e + b* a * + b*

b* + e
cA ; 

v
a* + b* + 2e a* + b* + e
cB ; 

,

a* + e

v
a* + b* + 2e a* + b* + e

and note that if cA = cB , the four thresholds above collapse to two identical thresholds that we denote as c ; v=2(2a* + e) = v=2(2b* + e).
Proposition 2. If cA ≥ c^A and cB ≥ c^B , then the equilibrium of the
discrete game is a pure strategy Nash or a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium as indicated in tables 2–4.
Proof of Proposition 2. See appendix. QED
The next ﬁgures visualize the results of proposition 2. Figure 3 describes the characteristics of the equilibrium as a function of the parties’ marginal costs of effort within the conditions set in proposition 1.
Table 2. Equilibria If cA < cB
cB > cB

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

cB ≤ cB ≤ cB

(a* , b* )
(a* , b* )

Mixed
(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )
(a* , b* )

cA ≤ cA

cA < cA < cA

cA ≥ cA

cB < cB

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser
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Table 3. Equilibria If cA = cB
(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

c≤c

Table 4.

c>c

Equilibria If cA > cB

cB ≥ cB

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

cB < cB < cB

(a* , b* )

Mixed

(a* , b* )

cB ≤ cB

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

(a* , b* )

cA < cA

cA ≤ cA ≤ cA

cA > cA

Next, we show how the position of the continuous game within the
cell with vertices in E affects the characteristics of the corresponding
equilibrium of the discrete game. Figure 4 depicts the characteristics
of the discrete equilibrium in the plane with coordinates (a*, b*) for
v = 100 and e = 1. The graph shows how the position of the continuous
equilibrium (a*, b*) within the square cell surrounding it affects the
type of equilibrium of the discrete game.
For instance, take the square cell that is closer to the origin in ﬁgure 4—the graph starts at (1, 1) because the conditions in proposition 1
bound the solution away from zero—and notice that if the continuous

Figure 3.
e = 1).

Equilibrium of the discrete game for different costs of effort (v = 100 and
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Figure 4. Equilibrium of the discrete game as a function of the equilibrium of the
continuous game (v = 100 and e = 1).

equilibrium is close to (1, 1), then the discrete game has a symmetric
equilibrium at (1, 1). Conversely, if the continuous equilibrium is close
to (2, 2), then the equilibrium of discrete game will be (2, 2). Similarly,
asymmetric equilibria of the discrete game will emerge when the continuous equilibrium approaches (1, 2) or (2, 1). In this case, there is no
room for mixed strategy equilibria. The next cell to the right, however,
allows for such a possibility when the continuous equilibrium (a*, b*)
is somewhat in the middle of the cell.
The following proposition shows that the pure strategy equilibria
identiﬁed thanks to propositions 1 and 2 are unique.
Proposition 3. If cA ≥ ^cA and cB ≥ ^cB , and if the discrete game has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3. See appendix. QED
Next, we examine the features of the mixed strategy equilibria
and, in particular, we characterize the mixing probabilities.
Proposition 4. If cA ≥ ^cA and cB ≥ c^B , and if the discrete game
has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then the equilibrium
mixing probabilities are
cB − cB
p*
ðA Þ
A =
cB − cB
cA − cA
ðBÞ
p*B =
cA − cA

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser
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so that party A chooses a* with probability p*
A and chooses a*
with the complementary probability 1 − p*
.
Similarly,
party B
A
chooses b* with probability p*B and chooses b* with the complementary probability 1 − p*B .
Proof of Proposition 4. See appendix. QED

4. CONTINUOUS APPROXIMATION
OF DISCRETE RENT-SEEKING GAMES
The results in proposition 1 show under what conditions the discrete
rent-seeking game can be easily solved by restricting attention to a
neighborhood E of the equilibrium of the continuous game. Here we address the related question of, within these conditions, how good the continuous approximation of a discrete equilibrium is. The following two
propositions show that the size of the contested prize, the asymmetry
in the parties’ costs of effort, and the coarseness of the parties’ discrete
effort sets affect the approximation in intuitive ways. Finally, proposition 7 shows that if the conditions of proposition 1 are violated, our
proposed procedure may fail.
Proposition 5. The conditions cA ≥ ^cA and cB ≥ ^cB are more easily satisﬁed if:
• The party’s decision sets are dense (e is small).
• The prize at stake is large (v is large).
• The parties’ marginal costs of effort are symmetric (cA and cB
are close to each other).
Proof of Proposition 5. See appendix. QED
Proposition 6. If cA ≥ ^cA and cB ≥ ^cB , mixed strategy equilibria
are less likely if the parties’ marginal costs of effort are symmetric (cA and cB are close to each other).
Proof of Proposition 6. See appendix. QED
Proposition 7. If cA < ^cA or cB < c^B , the procedure detailed in
proposition 2 may fail to identify the correct equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. See appendix. QED
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Figure 5. Candidate equilibria of a discrete game with v = 10,
cA = 3:5, cB = 0:5, and e = 1.

The proof of proposition 7 proceeds by example (v = 10, cA = 3:5,
cB = 0:5, and e = 1.). It is easy to verify that cB < ^cB and hence proposition 1 does not apply. (Moreover, because cA =cB > 3, we are in region I
in ﬁg. A2.) As shown in the appendix, in this case the procedure set out
in proposition 2 would select (0, 2) as an equilibrium. However, as
shown in ﬁgure 5, party B has an incentive to deviate and, namely, prefers (0, 1), which is outside the equilibrium set, over (0, 2), because the
former is closer to B’s reaction function. Hence, (0, 2) cannot be an equilibrium of the full game.
5. SYMMETRIC PARTIES
Consider now the case in which the parties are perfectly symmetric,
that is, cA = cB = c, the parties’ choice sets consist of the nonnegative integers, and the prize at stake is equal to v = 1. The solution of
the corresponding continuous game is notoriously a* = b* = 1=4c.
By proposition 1, we can focus attention on the restricted game
with a ∈ f( 1=4c), (1=4c)g and b ∈ f( 1=4c), (1=4c)g, that is, the parties’
action set includes only the integer above and the one below the

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser
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solution of the continuous game. Let (1=4c) ; y and (1=4c) = y + 1.
We have the following payoffs for party A and B, respectively:
b=y
a=y+1
a=y



y+1
2y+1

− c(y + 1),



1
2

− cy,

1
2

b=y+1

y
2y+1

− cy

− cy








1
2

− c(y + 1),

y
2y+1

− cy,

1
2

− c(y + 1)

y+1
2y+1

− c(y + 1)




Note that, because the parties are symmetric, then (a = y, b = y) is
a Nash equilibrium if neither party ﬁnds it advantageous to deviate
unilaterally to y + 1, that is, iff (1=2) − cy > ((y + 1)=(2y + 1))−c(y + 1).
If this condition is satisﬁed, there cannot be an asymmetric equilibrium in which one party plays y and the other plays y + 1. The former condition is equivalent to:
y>

1 1
− :
4c 2

(5)

Similarly, (a = y + 1, b = y + 1) is a Nash equilibrium if (1=2) − c(y + 1) >
(y=(2y + 1)) − cy, which again guarantees that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium. The former condition is equivalent to
y<

1 1
− :
4c 2

(6)

Because the two conditions (eqq. [5] and [6]) are mutually exclusive, for y ≠ (1=4c) − (1=2) the game has a unique, symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. (If y = (1=4c) − (1=2), both symmetric
and asymmetric equilibria are weakly supported. The parties are indifferent between playing y and y + 1, and there is also a continuum of
mixed strategy equilibria supported by any mixing probability.) Conditions (5) and (6) can be rewritten as (1=4c) < ((( 1=4c) + (1=4c))=2) and
(1=4c) > ((( 1=4c) + (1=4c))=2), respectively, where the right-hand side
of these inequalities is the midpoint between the integer below and
the integer above 1=4c. So rewritten, these conditions say that, if
the equilibrium of the continuous game is below the midpoint, that
is, if it is closer to the integer below, both parties will choose the integer below 1=4c in the equilibrium of the discrete game; otherwise,
they will choose the integer above. This leads to the following result:
Corollary 1. The discrete rent-seeking game with symmetric
marginal costs of effort c, v = 1, and e = 1 has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium iff c ≠ 1=(4n + 2) with n ∈ f0, 1, 2, :::g; otherwise, the game has four pure strategy Nash equilibria and a
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Figure 6. Equilibrium level of effort in the continuous and discrete games.

continuum of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. At the equilibrium,
the parties play the integer that is closest to their equilibrium
strategy in the continuous game.
The transformation rule from the continuous game to the discrete
game is hence very simple: in the discrete game, parties choose the
integer that is closest to the equilibrium of the continuous game.
Figure 6 illustrates this point. We see that the equilibrium is the integer below if the stepped line is below the curved line and is the integer above otherwise. As c increases, the parties move discontinuously from the integer above to the integer below the equilibrium
of the continuous game in a stepwise way. Note that in the symmetric case, mixed strategy equilibria occur only in the (degenerate) case
in which the parties are indifferent as to which strategy to play, that
is, when the equilibrium of the continuous game is exactly halfway
between two admissible discrete levels of effort.
6. AN APPLICATION TO EVIDENCE
PRODUCTION
6.1. Setup
We can now apply the theory developed earlier to evidence production
at trial. Experts, documents, and witnesses are typically discrete. Yet
reaching out to experts, reviewing documents, and ﬁnding and preparing witnesses are costly activities, and one could use the monetary
costs thereof as the choice variable. Although money can be thought
of as a continuous variable, changing the unit of measurement does
not make a discrete strategy space continuous. In the evidence production game, money is an input into the discovery of evidence, not
the choice being made.
We consider two parties—a plaintiff P and a defendant D—who
are in a dispute about a contested amount of money equal to v to be
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shared according to x ∈ (0, 1). On one interpretation, the plaintiff has a
contract claim against the defendant with vx as the true amount of
damages suffered by the plaintiff. An omniscient court would award
vx to plaintiff; but, though the parties know x, the court does not.
Thus, the court must rely on evidence submitted by the parties.
A piece of evidence is a signal s ∈ f−1, 1g, where s = 1 occurs with
probability p(x) and is a signal in favor of the plaintiff, whereas s = −1
occurs with the complementary probability 1 − p(x) and is a signal in
favor of the defendant, with p(x) monotonically increasing in x. This
simple structure captures the idea that the plaintiff has a higher
probability of ﬁnding evidence in his or her favor if he or she has suffered a larger loss, and vice versa for the defendant. In a perfectly
symmetric setup, we would have that 1 − p(1 − x) = p(x), which implies p(1=2) = 1=2 and ﬁrst-order symmetry px (x) = px (1 − x). A simple example of symmetric probabilities of ﬁnding evidence is given
by p(x) = x. We will analyze the general case and comment on the
symmetric case when needed.
Each party endogenously decides how many signals to collect. Then,
at trial, the court issues a judgment t = (r1 =(r1 + r−1 ))v (with t = 1=2 if
r1 = r−1 = 0), where r1 ; o(sjs = 1) and r−1 ; −o(sjs = −1). More plainly,
r1 is the number of signals s = 1 submitted to the court and, similarly, r−1
is the number of signals s = −1. The court simply considers the
relative number of signals submitted by each party the “weight of
the evidence.” Note that, if evidence were generated randomly, t would
be equal to the number of successes over the number of trials from a
Bernoulli distribution with probability p(x) and hence would be an unbiased estimator of x iff p(x) = x, which also satisﬁes ﬁrst-order symmetry as noted earlier. Evidence, however, is not a random process: parties
strategically decide how much to invest in evidence production and,
among the pieces of evidence they ﬁnd, parties decide which to submit
to the court and which to withhold.3 Before delving into the evidence
production process, let us ﬁrst summarize the timing of the game:4
• Time 0: A dispute arises; the parties jointly observe x and the
plaintiff ﬁles a lawsuit at no cost.
• Time 1: The parties endogenously and simultaneously decide
how many signals to collect (at a cost per signal).
• Time 2: Each party decides which of the collected signals to
submit to court, and the court adjudicates the case.

3
We thus assume that neither party has an obligation to reveal unfavorable evidence. In criminal trials in the United States, prosecutors do have an obligation to reveal exculpatory evidence.
4
We abstract from settlement because it is not essential to our analysis.
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The court is a mechanical player that adjudicates the case simply
based on the evidence submitted according to the rule of decision t.
Accordingly, because t increases in r1 and decreases in r−1, each party
has incentives to submit all favorable signals and to withhold all signals that are favorable to the other party. Hence, the game unfolds at
the evidence production stage.
6.2. Endogenous Investments in Litigation
Before trial, at time 2, the parties invest in attorney-hours with the
purpose of gathering evidence for trial. Each attorney draws an average of 1 signal per hour at a cost kP and kD, respectively. For simplicity,
we assume that the expected time needed to collect each extra signal
is constant. This allows us to describe evidence collection as a Poisson
process; as each party only submits favorable signals, the relevant
Poisson process has an arrival rate of favorable signals equal to p(x)
for the plaintiff and 1 − p(x) for the defendant.5 This is a possibly restrictive assumption, as it is more likely that collecting an additional
signal costs more time than the previous signals; yet it greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
Evidence collection is a sequential process that stops when the
marginal value of spending an additional hour of effort equals its
marginal cost. However, recall that a Poisson process is memoryless
and, hence, if it makes sense to invest additional time to ﬁnd a new
signal at time t, it also makes sense to keep investigating at time
t0 > t, indeed to keep investigating until that signal is found, because
the additional expected waiting time is constant as we go forward.
Crucially, the parties decide when to stop collecting signals independently of each other. Therefore, the question reduces to how many
(favorable) signals the parties would collect in the Nash equilibrium
of a game with simultaneous moves where the costs of collection are
the expected costs from the sequential Poisson process.
To calculate these costs, let us start with the plaintiff. Given that
the arrival rate of favorable signals is p(x) signals per hour, the average time needed to collect one signal is 1=p(x) hours and hence the
expected time needed to collect rP favorable signals is rP =p(x) hours
at an expected cost of rP kP =p(x). Similarly, the defendant expects to
spend rD kD =(1 − p(x)) to collect rD favorable signals.
The investments in attorney-hours are chosen by the parties to
maximize their expected trial outcome net of the costs. The parties’
5
Note that, in a Poisson process with base arrival rate k, if only a fraction p(x) of
the draws are kept and the rest is discarded, the resulting arrival rate of favorable signals is p(x)k. In our model, we have l = 1 and hence the plaintiff’s arrival rate of favorable signals is p(x) whereas the defendant’s arrival rate is 1 − p(x).

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser

303

decision problems are


rP
rP kP
ðplaintiffÞ
maxr
v−
rP + rD
pðx Þ
,


rP
rD kD
minr
ðdefendantÞ
v+
rP + rD
1 − pðx Þ
P

D

where the plaintiff maximizes the amount of money he or she will
collect from the defendant at trial net of his or her evidence collection costs; similarly, the defendant minimizes the amount of money
he or she will pay to the plaintiff plus his or her evidence collection
costs. Using rD =(rP + rD ) = 1 − (rP =(rP + rD )), we can rewrite the parties’ objectives more conveniently as


rP
rP kP
ðplaintiffÞ
maxr
v−
rP + rD
pðxÞ
:


rD
rD kD
maxr
− v ðdefendantÞ
v−
rP + rD
1 − pðx Þ
P

D

Assuming for now that rP and rD are continuous variables, the
ﬁrst-order conditions lead to the following result:
r*
P =

pðx Þð 1 − pðxÞÞ
vpðx ÞkD
2
ð pðx ÞkD + ð 1 − pðxÞÞkP Þ

r*D =

pðx Þð 1 − pðxÞÞ
v ð 1 − pðxÞÞkP
2
ð pðx ÞkD + ð 1 − pðxÞÞkP Þ

:

(7)

Note that, in the continuous strategy equilibrium, although the
parties collect different amounts of evidence—r*
P ≠ r*
D unless p(x) =
1 − p(x)—they spend the same amount of resources in attorney fees:
r*
r*D kD
pðx Þð 1 − pðxÞÞ
P kP
=
=
kP kD v:
pðx Þ 1 − pðx Þ ð pðx ÞkD + ð 1 − pðxÞÞkP Þ2
This is because the parties play a rent-seeking game with constant
marginal returns to effort. Therefore, the total cost of evidence production at trial (the total rent dissipation) is
D=2

pðx Þð 1 − pðx ÞÞ
kP kD v:
ð pðx ÞkD + ð 1 − pðx ÞÞkP Þ2

The analysis in section 3 can be applied to this case. We know
therefore that if kP =p(x) ≤ (r*
P − r*
D )=2r*
D and kD =(1 − p(x)) ≤ (r*
P − r*
P )=
,
at
the
equilibrium
of
the
discrete
game
the
plaintiff
will
choose
2r*
P
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*
either r*
P or rP or a mix of the two and, likewise, the defendant will
choose either r*D or r*D or a mix of the two.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
We have identiﬁed a class of discrete rent-seeking games for which the
equilibrium of the associated continuous rent-seeking game serves as
an approximation of the equilibrium of the discrete game. This analysis
is useful for two reasons. First, identifying the equilibria of the discrete
game may be a difﬁcult task as the payoff matrix may be very large. Identifying the equilibrium of the continuous game is relatively straightforward. Our analysis dramatically simpliﬁes the analysis to a simple twostep procedure. One ﬁrst determines the equilibrium of the continuous
game. Then one examines the four discrete points in the mesh closest
to the continuous equilibrium. Moreover, we identify factors that
make the continuous equilibrium a better approximation of the equilibrium in the discrete game.
Second, discrete rent-seeking games are substantively important as
they are the natural way to model widespread social phenomena. Aspects of litigation provide the most obvious example. The incentive
effects of legal rules are mediated by the litigation process as people
act ex ante in the shadow of the law, that is, in the shadow of the expected outcome at trial. That outcome, of course, depends on the behavior of the litigating parties in the gathering and presentation of evidence. But evidence is not a continuous variable; it comes in discrete
bundles. Each litigant must decide which bundles to gather and to
submit to the court. Many other phenomena share this discrete structure. Companies, for instance, acquire patents to restrict entry into
the industry; again, patents are a discrete quantity.
Finally, we wish to emphasize two limitations of our analysis and
suggest possible extensions. First, we assumed that the parties’ discrete effort sets are equally spaced, that is, that the parties can
choose among similar sets of possibilities. This assumption holds
in all of the applications that we suggested. In reality, however, there
could be cases in which a party can choose among a set of discrete
options that is ﬁner than the set available to the other party. Think,
for instance, of a situation in which party A’s effort set consists of
the nonnegative integers whereas party B’s effort set consists of multiples of 1=2 and hence party B has more options to choose from.6
We conjecture that our results will qualitatively apply to this case,
although the exact conditions will necessarily change quantitatively.
6

That is, we have eA ≠ eB .
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The intuition is that a change in the relative coarseness of the parties’ choice sets results in an asymmetry that has similar effects on
the parties’ abilities to optimize their behavior as the parties’ costs
of effort, as emphasized in the introduction. Second, we have provided
an analysis of simultaneous rent-seeking games, whereas in reality
parties often choose sequentially. Again, we conjecture that our main
results will qualitatively apply to a sequential game, although the speciﬁc quantitative aspects of our results will necessarily change.

APPENDIX
A1. Example
In table A1, we report the parties’ payoffs for all feasible levels of effort in relation to the example in table 1 and ﬁgure 1.
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To prove the proposition, it is sufﬁcient to show that unilateral deviations outside the equilibrium set E reduce the payoff of the
deviating party. We will focus on party B’s decisions under the assumption that party A has chosen either a* or a* . (Applying the
same logic to party A will then be trivial.) The proof is structured
as follows. We will ﬁrst offer some useful preliminary observations
on party B’s reaction function, which will allow us to partition the
space into three different regions. We will then prove the results of
the proposition by analyzing each of these regions in turn.
A2.1. Preliminary Observations. Party B’s reaction function, b**(a),
as given in equation (3), is depicted in ﬁgure A1.
Note that the slope of b**(a) is:
1.
2.
3.

db**
da
db**
da
db**
da

= 1 at a =

v
16cB ;

= 0 at a =

v
4cB ;

> −1 at a = cvB .

Let us now consider the possible location of the equilibrium of the
continuous game (a*, b*) as deﬁned in equation (2), which must necessarily lie along B’s reaction function. For a given cB, the dashed
lines in ﬁgure A2 depict party A’s reaction function at different levels of A’s marginal cost of effort, cA. The following observations will
be useful later.
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Figure A1.

Party B’s reaction function.

Figure A2.
game.

Slope of b**(a) at different equilibria of the continuous

Lemma 1. Using (2) and the slope of b**(a), we can identify three
regions of party B’s reaction function as depicted in ﬁgure A2:
Region I: If cA > 3cB , we have a* < v=16cB and the slope of b**(a)
is db** =da > 1; therefore, in region I, the line with slope 1 and
that passes through the equilibrium of the continuous game
(a*, b*) crosses b**(a) from above.
Region II: If cB ≤ cA ≤ 3cB , we have v=16cB ≤ a* ≤ v=4cB and the
slope of b**(a) is 0 ≤ (db** =da) ≤ 1; therefore, in region II, the
line with slope 1 and that passes through the equilibrium of
the continuous game (a*, b*) crosses b**(a) from below.
Region III: If cA < cB , we have v=4cB < a* ≤ v=cB and the slope of
b**(a) is −1 < (db** =da) < 0; in region III, the line with slope −1
that passes through the equilibrium of the continuous game
(a*, b*) crosses b**(a) from above.
Proof of Lemma 1. Omitted. QED
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In the discrete game, because each party can choose among a countable set of (equally spaced) points, the possible equilibria of the game
can be visualized as the nodes of a grid in the (a, b) space. The line with
slope 1 or −1 that passes through the equilibrium of the continuous
game will be important because it limits the number of points that
we will need to consider in the proof, as will be clear later.
A2.2. Region III. We can now start tackling the proof by beginning
from region III. Further, let us start by assuming that party A has
chosen a* and then repeat the exercise for a* .
A2.2.1 Region III: Party A Chooses a* . Party B’s possible effort
choices can be visualized as the points (a* , b) with b ∈ f0, e,2e, :::g,
which are located along the vertical line passing through a* ; see ﬁgure A3. We will show that party B’s payoff at any point (a* , b) with
b > b* is less than at the point (a* , b* ) and, similarly, that B’s payoff
at any point (a* , b) with b < b* is less than at the point (a* , b* ). That
is: party B does not have an incentive to deviate unilaterally outside
the set E, given party A’s choice of a* . (Repeating the exercise for the
case of a = a* will conclude the proof for region III. We will then run
the same analysis in regions II and I.)
To start with, note that, although the point (a* , b* ) is always
above B’s reaction function, the point (a* , b* ) could be either below
or above B’s reaction function. This is due to the fact that B’s reaction
function—which passes through (a*, b*)—decreases in a and hence is
below the horizontal b*-line when a > a* . This in turn implies that
all the points (a* , b) above the horizontal b*-line also lie above B’s reaction function—as is the case for the point (a* , b* )—whereas the points
(a* , b) below the horizontal b*-line may lie above or below B’s reaction
function. Therefore, the point (a* , b* ) could be either below or above
B’s reaction function. Let us consider these two cases in turn.
If (a* , b* ) is below B’s reaction function, we are in the case depicted
in ﬁgure A3, where the points (a* , b) with b < b* lie below B’s reaction
function and the points (a* , b) with b > b* lie above B’s reaction function. Given that B’s payoff is concave in b and maximal along B’s reaction function, it follows that B’s payoff decreases if B moves above
b* or below b* , which proves that B will not deviate outside the equilibrium set E.
If instead (a* , b* ) is above B’s reaction function, as depicted in ﬁgure A4, the reasoning above breaks down because now we need to
compare (a* , b* )—which, by hypothesis, is above B’s reaction function—with points (a* , b) with b < b* possibly below B’s reaction
function, and concavity does not help us solve this problem. The
point (a* , b* ) still dominates all points (a* , b) above it, but we need
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to show that (a* , b* ) dominates all points (a* , b) below it. To do so,
we will ﬁrst establish an intermediate result.
Let
^ − ðaÞ = a* + b* − a
b
be the line with slope −1 that passes through the equilibrium of the
continuous game (the dotted diagonal in ﬁgure A4), which we mentioned in Lemma 1 above; then:
Lemma 2. Given party A’s choice of effort, a, party B’s payoff is
^ − (a).
weakly greater at b = b* than at b = b
Proof of Lemma 2. We need to show that (b* =(a + b* ))v −
^ − (a)=(a + b
^ − (a)))v − b
^ − (a)cB . Replacing b
^ − (a) and rearrangb* cB ≥ (b
ing, we have that the latter inequality is satisﬁed iff




 

a* − a av − a* + b* a + b* cB ≤ 0:

(8)

The ﬁrst factor is positive if a < a* and negative if a > a* . Using
equation (2), the second factor can be rewritten as


aðcA + cB Þ3 v − aðcA + cB Þ2 + cA v cB
ðcA + cB Þ3

= aðcA + cB Þ2 − cB v


cA
v,
ðcA + cB Þ3

2
which is positive iff a > (cB =(cA + cB ) )v = a* and negative if a < a* . It
follows that the two factors in equation (8) have the opposite sign
and hence that the inequality is strictly satisﬁed if a < a* or a > a* .
If a = a* , then equation (8) holds as an equality. QED

Lemma 2 shows that given A’s choice of a* , B’s payoff is higher
when B chooses the continuous-equilibrium level of effort b* rather
^ − (a* ) lying on the line with slope −1 that
than the level of effort b
passes through the continuous equilibrium. Note that, importantly,
the lemma compares all possible levels of effort within these sets, thus
not only those admitted in the discrete game. In turn, this is not a problem for our purposes because we will use these comparisons of effort
levels merely as intermediate steps of the proof. We will now combine
lemma 2 with the observations in lemma 1 to prove our result.
First, it is easy to verify graphically that, in the discrete game, the
^ − (a* ), that is, under
ﬁrst feasible effort level below b* must be at b ≤ b
the line with slope −1. To see why, note the widest distance between
^ − (a* ) is achieved when, given b* , b
^ − (a* ) is as low as possible,
b* and b
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that is, when the point (a*, b*) overlaps with the point (a* , b* ). Yet in
this case the ﬁrst point below b* must lie exactly on the line with
slope −1, which proves that the observation above is correct.
^ − (a) crosses B’s reaction
From lemma 1 we know that the line b
function from above. Looking at ﬁgure A4, notice that, if A plays a* ,
^ − (a* ) than at any point below it because of the
B’s payoff is greater at b
concavity of B’s reaction function. By lemma 2, B’s payoff is greater
^ − (a* ). Further, B’s payoff is greater at b* than it is at b*
at b* than at b
again due to concavity, because both points are above B’s reaction function but b* is closer to it. By transitivity, B’s payoff is greater at b* than
at any point below even when b* is above B’s reaction function. (Note
^ − (a* ) are in party B’s disagain that it is immaterial whether b* and b
crete choice set because they are never actually chosen.)
A2.2.2 Region III: Party A Chooses a* . We can now prove that if
A plays a* , then B’s payoff is greater at b* than at any point above
it. Similarly to what we noted earlier, the point (a* , b* ) is always below B’s reaction function, but the point (a* , b* ) could be above or
below it. Yet because lemma 2 applies equally to the left and to
the right of a*, the proof is a trivial replication of the reasoning
above. Combining the previous results, we can conclude that in region III party B does not have an incentive to deviate outside the
equilibrium set E.
^ + (a) = a + b* − a*
A2.3. Region II. Let us now turn to region II. Let b
be the line with slope 1 that passes through the equilibrium of the
continuous game as shown in ﬁgure A5, then:
Lemma 3. In region II, given party A’s choice of effort, a, party
^ + (a) iff cB ≥
B’s payoff is weakly greater at b = b* than at b = b
*
*
*
(b − a )=2a .
Proof of Lemma 3. We need to show that, under the condi^ + (a)=
tions set out in the lemma, (b* =(a + b* ))v − b* cB ≥ (b
+
+
+
^
^
^
(a + b (a)))v − b (a)cB . Replacing b (a), a*, and b*, and rearranging, we have that the latter inequality is satisﬁed iff


ðcA + cB Þ2 − cB v 2 2aðcA + cB Þ2 cB − ðcA − cB Þv


≥ 0:
ðcA + cB Þ2 aðcA + cB Þ2 + cA v 2aðcA + cB Þ2 + ððcA − cB ÞvÞ

(9)

Given that in region II we have cA > cB , the denominator is positive.
2
The numerator is weakly positive iff a ≥ ((cA − cB )=(2(cA + cB ) cB ))v.
Given that we are interested in cases in which party A plays a ≥ a* ,
the condition becomes
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a* ≥

cA − cB
b* − a *
v=
2
2cB
2ðcA + cB Þ cB

(10)

b* − a*
:
2a*

(11)

or
cB ≥

QED
Lemma 3 provides a result that is analogous to lemma 2, with the
only relevant difference that the lemma is now applicable only to
the right of a speciﬁed threshold level of a. As is clear from ﬁgure A5,
also in this case, two of the relevant points in the set E can be either
above or below B’s reaction function, and we can use lemma 3 to prove
the result as we did with lemma 2. We can therefore apply the reasoning
developed for region III to region II to show that party B does not have
incentives to deviate outside the equilibrium set E whenever the condition in lemma 3 is satisﬁed.
A2.4. Region I. Note that the condition in equation (11) can never
be satisﬁed in region I. Hence, this proposition applies to region III
and a portion of region II but does not apply to region I.
Repeating the same exercise for party A’s reaction function and
combining the results completes the proof. QED
A3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Note that under the conditions of proposition 1 the point (0, 0)
is not part of the equilibrium set E unless cA = cB , a case that we discuss in section 5. Hence, here we can be sure that the discrete game is
bounded away from zero, that is, a* ≥ 1 and b* ≥ 1. Given the results
in proposition 1, we can focus on the restricted game with a ∈ fa* , a* g
and b ∈ fb* , b* g. Note that a* = a* + e and b* = b* + e. We have the
following payoffs matrix for (A, B):
b = b* + e

b = b*
a = a* + e

a = a*



a* +e

v − cA (a* + e),

b*
v − cB b*
a* + e + b*

a*
v − cA a* ,
a* + b*

b*
v − cB b*
a* + b*

a* + e + b*



a* + e

v − cA (a* + e),

v − cB (b* + e)

a* + b* + 2e
b* + e
a* + b* + 2e



a*
a * + e + b*

b* + e
a* + e + b*

v − c A a* ,

v − cB (b* + e)
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The equilibrium conditions are
• (a = a* , b = b* ) is a Nash equilibrium if
a*
a* + b*
b*
a* + b*

v − cA a* >
v − cB b* >

a* + e
a * + e + b*
b* + e
a * + e + b*



v − cA a* + e


v − cB b* + e

or
cA > 

b*

 v ; cA ðAÞ
*
a + e + b* a* + b*

a*
cB > 

 v ; cB ðBÞ
a* + e + b* a* + b*

:

• (a = a* + e, b = b* + e) is a Nash equilibrium if


a* + e
a*
v − cA a*
v − cA a* + e >
*
*
*
a + b + 2e
a + e + b*


b* + e
b*
v − cB b*
v − cB b* + e >
*
*
*
a + b + 2e
a + e + b*
or
cA < 

b* + e

 v ; cA ðAÞ
a* + b* + 2e a* + b* + e

a* + e
cB < 

 v ; cB ðBÞ
*
*
a + b + 2e a* + b* + e

:

• (a = a* + e, b = b* ) is a Nash equilibrium if
cA < cA ðAÞ
cB > cB ðBÞ

:

• (a = a* , b = b* + e) is a Nash equilibrium if
cA > cA ðAÞ
cB < cB ðBÞ

:

• There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in all other cases.
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Note that if a* > b* , we have cA > cA (and hence cA < cA and cA > cA
cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed) and cB > cB (and hence cB > cB
and cB < cB cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed) because:
cA ≥ cA
⇔
b* + e
b*


 ≥


a* + b* + 2e a* + b* + e
a* + e + b* a* + b*
⇔
b* + e
b*
≥
*
*
*
a + b + 2e a + b*
⇔





b* + e a* + b* ≥ b* a* + b* + 2e
⇔
a* + b* ≥ 2b*
⇔
a* ≥ b*

Floor



⇔



cB
cA
v
≥
Floor
v
ðcA + cB Þ2
ðcA + cB Þ2
⇔
cB ≥ cA

and similarly for the inequality cB > cB . Analogously, if a* < b* , we
have cA < cA (and hence cA < cA and cA > cA cannot be simultaneously
satisﬁed) and cB > cB (and hence cB > cB and cB < cB cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed). Let us now verify that the conditions for pure
strategy Nash equilibria do not overlap and that there are cases in
which the equilibrium is in mixed strategy. Tables 2 and 4 do the
work. The proof of the case with cA = cB is trivial. QED
A4. Proof of Proposition 3
Sketch of the Proof. (The full proof is available upon request.) We already know from proposition 1 that points lying on the four lines
a = a* , a = a* , b = b* , and b = b* are dominated by points in E. Hence,
to prove the uniqueness of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we only
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need to show that every other point on the vertices of the grid in the
(a, b) space admits a unilateral deviation to a point on one of these four
lines. We will do so by considering the case with cA ≥ cB (the opposite
case is analogous).
Let us start by using the lines a = a* and b = b* to divide the
plane into four regions as shown in ﬁgure A6 and examine each of
them in turn.
Region 1 (a < a* and b ≥ b* ): Every point in region 1 is above B’s
reaction function. Hence, B will ﬁnd it convenient to deviate
from any b > b* to b = b* .
Region 2 (a ≥ a* and b ≥ b* ): Similarly, region 2 is entirely to the
right of A’s reaction function; A will ﬁnd it convenient to deviate from any a > a* to a = a* .
^ − (a) with
Region 3 (a ≥ a* and b < b* ): Consider again the line b

slope −1 passing through the point {a*, b*}, which was introduced in lemma 2. We can then apply a similar reasoning as
we did in proposition 1 to show that for every point below this
line, B has an incentive to deviate to b* , and for every point
above this line, A has an incentive to deviate to a* .
^
Region 4 (a < a* and b < b* ): Consider the horizontal line b = b,
^
^
with b such that a** (b) = a* ; this line crosses the point at
which A’s reaction function intersects the line a = a* for the
ﬁrst time (the second time is obviously for b = b* ), as depicted
in ﬁgure A6. Note that, by construction, the area above this
horizontal line is entirely to the left of A’s reaction function
and hence A will ﬁnd it convenient to deviate from any a < a*
in this area to a = a* . Consider now the area below the horizontal line and draw the line b = a, which divides the area into
two subareas, as in ﬁgure A6. Note that A’s payoff is greater
at a = a* than it is at a = b (proof omitted); then apply the same
reasoning as for region 3 to show that every point above the diagonal admits a unilateral deviation by A to a* . Similarly, B’s payoff is greater at b = b* than it is at b = a (proof omitted), and again
by the same reasoning, every point below the diagonal admits a
deviation to b* . This concludes the proof for region 4.
Summing up, all points in each of the regions in which we have subdivided the plane admit a deviation to a point on one of the four lines
passing through E, and we know from proposition 1 that all points on
these lines admit a unilateral deviation to a point in E. We can conclude that if there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in E, then this
equilibrium must be unique. QED
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A5. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In a mixed strategy, A chooses a* with probability pA and
a* + e with the complementary probability 1 − pA , which are such
that B is indifferent between b* and b* + e. Similarly, B chooses
b* with probability pB. We have





a*
a*
v − cA a* + ð1 − pB Þ
v − cA a*
a * + b*
a * + e + b*








a* + e
a* + e
= pB
v − cA a* + e + ð1 − pB Þ
v − cA a* + e ðAÞ
a* + e + b*
a* + b* + 2e




b*
b*
*
*
pA
v − cB b + ð1 − pA Þ
v − cB b
a * + b*
a * + e + b*








b* + e
b* + e
= pA
v − cB b* + e + ð1 − pA Þ
v − cB b* + e ðBÞ
a * + e + b*
a* + b* + 2e
pB

or
cA = pB cA + ð1 − pB ÞcA ðAÞ
cB = pA cB + ð1 − pA ÞcB ðBÞ
or
cB − cB
ðA Þ
p*A =
cB − cB
cA − cA
ðBÞ
p*B =
cA − cA

:

QED
A6. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Given that, by deﬁnition, we have a* ≥ a* − e, the inequality
in equation (10) implies the following sufﬁcient condition a* − e ≥
2
((cA − cB )=(2(cA + cB ) cB ))v, which can be rewritten as e ≤ ((2c2B − cA +
2
cB )=(2(cA + cB ) cB ))v. Repeating the exercise for the case in which
cA > cB , we have the following threshold:
2c2A − cB + cA 2c2B − cA + cB
^e ; min
v,
v :
(12)
2ðcA + cB Þ2 cA 2ðcA + cB Þ2 cB
If e ≤ ^e, then also the condition in equation (10) must be satisﬁed.
It is easy to see that the condition in equation (12) is more easily satisﬁed if v is large, if e is small, and if the costs are similar. Figure A7

Dari-Mattiacci and Kornhauser

315

shows how this sufﬁcient condition relates to the conditions in equation (4) and how sensitive is it to variation in e. QED
A7. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let us start from the case in which cA < cB (the opposite case is
analogous). From proposition 2, we know that a mix strategy equilibrium occurs in the space ½cA , cA  × ½cB , cB . If this space shrinks, the
mixed strategy equilibrium becomes less likely. Let us then consider:
b* + e
b*

v

v − 
a* + b* + 2e a* + b* + e
a* + e + b* a* + b*
"
#
,
a* − b*
ev
= 
 


a* + b* a* + b* + 2e
a * + e + b*

cA − cA = 

which decreases to zero if a* − b* approach zero, which is in turn the
case when costs are symmetric. An analogous reasoning applies to
the length of the second dimension, cB − cB . QED
A8. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. To prove the proposition, it is sufﬁcient to ﬁnd parameter values such that the algorithm presented in proposition 2 fails to identify the equilibrium. Set v = 10, cA = 3:5, cB = 0:5, and e = 1. Note
that these parameters do not satisfy the conditions in proposition 1.
Then a* = 0:31 so that a* = 0 and a* = 1; similarly, b* = 2:18 so
that b* = 2 and b* = 3. Hence the equilibrium set is E =f(0, 2), (1, 2),
(0, 3),(1, 3)g. Finally, we have cA = 10=3 > 5=2 = cA and cB = 0 < 5=6 =
cB .
Because cA > cB , we can use table 4. Because cA > cA and cB <
cB < cB , table 4 suggests that the game should have the symmetric
Nash equilibrium (0, 2). However, it is easy to verify in table A2 that
(0, 2) is not an equilibrium because party B has an incentive to deviate to (0, 1). QED

Figure A3. Party B’s reactions in region III when (a* , b* ) is below
and (a* , b* ) is above B’s reaction function.

Figure A4. Party B’s reactions in region III when both (a* , b* )
and (a* , b* ) are above the reaction function.
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Figure A5. Party B’s reactions in region II when (a* , b* ) is above
and (a* , b* ) is below B’s reaction function.

Figure A6. Uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium: (a) party
B’s reaction function; (b) both parties’ reaction functions.
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Figure A7.

Scope of the sufﬁcient condition in equation (12) (v = 10 and e = 1).

Figure A8. Values of cA and cB for which the sufﬁcient condition
in equation (12) is veriﬁed for different values of e (v = 10).
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0
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0
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0







5
5





a=2

a=1

a=0

b=1

Parties’ Payoffs
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Table A1.

 0 
6:4

 −11:67 
−1:93333

 −9:818 
−1:78182

 −8:000 
−1:6

 −6:222 
−1:37778

 −4:500 
−1:1

 −2:857 
−:742857

 −1:333 
−:266667

 0 
:4

 1:000 
1:4

 0 
:6

:5000
2:1



 −12:31 
−3:09231

 −10:50 
−2:9

 −8:727 
−2:67273

 −7:000 
−2:4

 −5:333 
−2:06667

 −3:750 
−1:65

 −2:286 
−1:11429

 −1:000 
−:4



 0 
4:6
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0
:8

0
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 −11:08 
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−14:12
−8:48235
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−7:93333
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−7:21538
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 −3:000 
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−8:7
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2
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0
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0
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0
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0
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0
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0
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0
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0





3
0
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0
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9:5



5
5
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a=6

a=5

a=4

a=3

a=2

a=1

a=0

b=1

Parties’ Payoffs

b=0

Table A2.

 0
9





−4:5
3

−2
4

 −26:6667 
:666667

 −23:3182 
:818182

 −20 
1

 −16:7222 
1:22222

 −13:5 
1:5

 −10:3571 
1:85714

 −7:33333 
2:33333





−5:5
3:5

−3
4:5




 −27:3077 
:807692

 −24 
1

 −20:7273 
1:22727

 −17:5 
1:5

 −14:3333 
1:83333

 −11:25 
2:25

 −8:28571 
3:5





 −1 
6

 0 
8:5
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 −27:8571 
:857143

 −24:5769 
1:07692

 −21:3333 
1:33333

 −18:1364 
1:63636
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2
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3
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8
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 0 
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4:5
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2
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 0
7
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1:5
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2:33333

 −10:3636 
2:86364

 −7:5 
3:5

 −4:77778 
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 −2:25 
5:25

 0 
6:5

b=7

for the Discrete Game with v = 10, cA = 3.5, cB = 0.5, and e = 1
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A
B
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4



 −29:4444 
:444444

 −26:2059 
:705882

 −23 
1

 −19:8333 
1:33333
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2:15385
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 0
6

b=8
0
5:5



−8
3



0
5



−5:33333
3:33333
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0
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:263158
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1:5
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